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C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000442

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STATE FOR WHA A/S TOM SHANNON
INL A/S ANNE PATTERSON
PM ACT. A/S STEPHEN MULL
SOUTHCOM FOR ADMIRAL STAVRIDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
STATE PASS TO OMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017
TAGS: [MASS](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [SNAR](#) [ASEC](#) [CASC](#) [MOPS](#) [OMB](#) [VZ](#) [CH](#)
JM, XL
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: ELIMINATION OF FY-08 FMF WILL HAVE SEVERE
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES; REQUEST THAT FMF BE RESTORED FOR
FY-08 AND BEYOND

REF: CBJ FOR FY-08

Classified By: Ambassador Brenda L. Johnson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTED

1.(C) The elimination of the FY-08 FMF (Foreign Military
Financing) funding allocation for Jamaica in the
Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) will:

-- have a detrimental impact on our bilateral relations by
sending the negative message to the Government of Jamaica
(GoJ) that we are reducing our security engagement in the
country and the region;

-- create a target of opportunity for Venezuela and China,
offering them a chance to bolster their roles as regional
counterweights to the U.S., thus increasing the Government of
Jamaica (GoJ)'s vulnerability to coercion;

-- undercut our efforts in counter-narcotics, homeland
security, anti-crime, anti-corruption, and other areas.

Ambassador therefore requests that Washington restore FMF for
Jamaica in FY-08 and beyond.
End Summary and Action Requested.

Harmful Impact on Bilateral Relations

2.(C) Elimination of the FMF funding will have a detrimental
impact on our bilateral relations by sending the negative
message to the GoJ that we are reducing our security
engagement in the country and the region. The Jamaica
Defence Force (JDF) and GoJ will likely view the elimination
of funding as unfair and unprovoked, as they have not
violated the 1963 Defense Agreement between the US and
Jamaica, have not violated the conditions set forth in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, nor been subject to any
illegal trafficking sanctions. In addition, the JDF and GoJ
will consider the elimination of the FMF funding as proof of
weakening U.S. resolve to back alliances and defense
commitments, both in this hemisphere and globally.

Invitation to Chavez and China

3.(C) Moreover, elimination of FMF funding will create a target of opportunity for Venezuela and China, offering them a chance to bolster their roles as regional counterweights to the U.S. and increasing the GoJ's vulnerability to coercion. The Government of Venezuela (GoV) has designed and funded foreign assistance programs that directly confront U.S. programs or take advantage of reductions in U.S. assistance in the hemisphere. Any significant or widespread reduction of FMF will serve as a lucrative target for the GoV, especially if it draws media attention. The GoV is likely to offer a program to fill the void left by removal of FMF, possibly through purchases of Russian or Chinese-origin equipment. Also, while China thus far has limited its contributions to non-lethal and less controversial items (i.e., uniforms, tents, and computers), it has increased assistance to Jamaica; it may well view elimination of FMF as an opportunity to enhance its role in equipping and supplying the JDF.

Homeland Security Implications

4.(C) Elimination of FMF will hinder our efforts to have a strong third border defense by leaving large gaps in the operational capability of the JDF, thus continuing to burden US forces with much of the counter-illicit trafficking duties in the region. As one of the first nations to be included in Phase 1 of "Enduring Friendship", Jamaica will lack the modern equipment it needs to be a vital partner in the forward defense of the US homeland and to have an advantage over illicit-trafficking organizations.

Material Impact on Jamaica Defence Force

5.(SBU) Loss of FMF may undercut JDF will and capability to contribute to regional and combined operations. The procurement of US-origin equipment has enhanced the JDF's operational readiness and is an instrumental step in more closely aligning JDF doctrine and tactics with those of the US DoD. Purchases of U.S.-origin equipment positively influence JDF preferences and decisions to attend U.S. DoD training through the IMET Program. Commonality of equipment and doctrine improves the likelihood that the JDF could be integrated quickly and efficiently with US forces for coalition operations; conversely, termination of FMF may undercut JDF will and capability to contribute to regional and combined operations.

6.(SBU) The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) will be unable to procure equipment essential to counter illicit trafficking and maintain operational readiness. A large percentage of its budget is consumed by operational expenses (i.e., salaries, rent, fuel), leaving little for equipment or parts. The JDF will be unable to purchase U.S.-origin night vision equipment to improve the Air Wing's and Coast Guard's night and inclement weather capabilities. Also, the JDF recently have established the Jamaican Military Aviation School, and had planned to use the night vision systems to support its rotary and fixed-wing pilot training. Without FMF, the JDF's planned adoption of US DoD standard weapons (M4 and M16A4 Rifles and M9 Pistols) will be in jeopardy: to date, they have procured (primarily through the FMF program) sufficient M16-variant weapons to equip 70 percent of their force; they need to rapidly complete this fielding to benefit from standardized training, operations, maintenance and supply systems.

Increasing Strain on INCLE Funds, Counter-Narcotics, Counter-Corruption Efforts

7.(SBU) Moreover, as DOD funding is cut, the Mission's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) will be asked to bear an even greater burden of support for the JDF and JCF (Jamaica Constabulary Force) to enable their continued interdiction and eradication of illegal drugs. Their needs for

operational support (equipment, training) will put pressure on funding that is sorely needed for new policy initiatives, such as: (a) our Tripartite Anti-Corruption Strategy, launched in FY-07 with the U.K. and Canadian missions, which is a direct outgrowth of the President's Anti-Kleptocracy Initiative; and (b) our support of the Police Civilian Oversight Commission's efforts to reform the JCF.

8.(SBU) In the absence of FMF, the resulting "fill-in-the-gap" pressures on NAS assistance and leadership will reduce interdiction and eradication of illegal drugs, and the new anti-corruption policy initiatives would suffer. This would provide criminal organizations opportunities to augment their smuggling activities in Jamaica, money laundering would increase, and the flow of weapons for drugs would swell. All of these likely outcomes would have a commensurate deleterious effect on U.S. interests: crime and violence would increase, thus threatening the one million U.S. tourists who visit annually; the flows of cocaine and marijuana from Jamaica to the U.S. would increase, as criminal organizations take advantage of diminished enforcement.

JOHNSON